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Executive Summary
Conflict between Baghdad and Erbil over the disputed territories has long been a key 
driver of instability in Iraq. These territories are inhabited by a mix of ethno-sectarian 
groups, including Kurds, Sunni and Shiʿa Arabs, Turkmen and a number of smaller minori-
ties. From 2003 until the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014, the federal and Kurdish 
sides have sought to shape the loyalties of these communities, extending enhanced ser-
vices and economic benefits to supporters. Following the defeat of ISIS and the ill-timed 
Kurdish independence referendum in 2017, the territories simultaneously witnessed the 
near total erasure of the once-powerful Kurdish security and administrative presence and 
the assertion of forces and functionaries aligned with the Government of Iraq (GoI) and 
the Shiʿa political blocs in Baghdad. 
The various forces operating under the umbrella of the GoI are not always unified, 
however. They include disparate quasi-state armed actors and political factions, all of 
which employ ethno-nationalist rhetoric and patronage relationships to compete with 
one another and establish supportive constituencies. The new phase of conflict in the 
disputed territories is therefore one defined by micro-political contests over control and 
a resulting sense of despair among citizens over the disintegration of coherent public 
authority. Any framework for resolving the broader conflict between Baghdad and 
Erbil must first prioritise curbing the continued fragmentation of administrative 
and security structures at the local level. 
Government of Iraq (GoI)
The main priority of the GoI should be to re-establish capacity and professionalism among 
security forces and administrators. This would include training and expanding federal 
and local police forces in addition to respected army units such as the Rapid Response 
Force (RRF). Kurds and Sunni Arabs must be encouraged to join the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF), and the usage of sectarian markers of affiliation should be entirely banned. Given 
the preponderance of criminal groups and illegal rent-seeking on roadways, all check-
points should be manned by professional federal forces. Government jobs and resources 
for public projects such as electricity, water and municipal buildings must be restored and 
distributed equitably and without favouritism with regards to ethno-sectarian affiliation. 
The GoI must prioritise and move quickly. If the current disintegration of public author-
ity were to continue unabated, the short- and long-term implications would be severe: 
Ethno-nationalists among the Kurds, Sunni and Shiʿa Arabs and Shiʿa Turkmen would be 
able to capitalise on the tensions in the disputed territories to increase social capital. Such 
a development would only exacerbate the militarisation and securitisation of politics in 
the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and the rest of the country. 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
While the security presence of the KRG will likely remain diminished in the short term, 
Kurdish leaders should cooperate wherever possible with the ISF in order to ensure con-
tinued protection for Kurds residing across the disputed territories. Administratively, the 
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KRG must move quickly to develop a reasonable employment status for the thousands 
of employees on KRG payroll who no longer hold positions following the GoI reassertion 
of control. Finally, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP) leaders should avoid inflammatory ethno-nationalist rhetoric at all costs. Ultra-na-
tionalist language is a politically expedient driver of support within the areas under KRG 
control; however, the same rhetoric often exposes Kurds to violence in the disputed terri-
tories due to heightened tensions between groups. 
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) 
While commencing talks over a final deal may not be possible under the current politi-
cal environment, it is entirely possible and necessary for local-level mediations on more 
limited issues (e.g. property claims, equitable government employment and integrated 
security arrangements) to proceed. This will help to reduce simmering tensions between 
the federal and Kurdish sides. In determining priority areas for intervention, UNAMI medi-
ation teams should avoid excessive emphasis on Kirkuk at the expense of often neglected, 
but strategically crucial, areas such as northern Diyala and Tuz Khurmatu.
The International Community
Donor-funded NGO projects which build infrastructure, train administrators, and 
strengthen civil society should be encouraged as they will complement the GoI’s efforts 
to restore legitimate forms of public authority. In general, the international community 
must widen engagement with the disputed territories beyond narrowly-defined energy 
interests and efforts to fight terrorism.
Introduction
Conflict between Erbil and Baghdad has become a central destabilising feature of the 
post-2003 era. After the US-led invasion, portions of Nineveh, Kirkuk, Salahaddin and 
Diyala were designated as ‘disputed territories’ or ‘disputed internal boundaries’ (DIBs) 
under Constitutional Article 140. The Article held that local referenda were to occur in 
order for their final status to be determined. Such referenda never took place, and instead 
a competition between the KRG and the GoI became entrenched across the territories.1 
The Kurds made the first series of moves, partly because they were emboldened by the 
disproportionate favour of US forces. Soon after the fall of the regime in 2003, the KRG 
expanded its influence across the disputed territories. In some areas of the DIBs, the 
Peshmerga were granted control over ground security in coordination with the Coalition 
Forces. More importantly, the KRG’s extensive payroll enabled the regional government to 
gain support through patronage politics. The GoI escalated its engagement with the DIBs 
in the 2008–14 period, coinciding with the withdrawal of US troops. As part of the broader 
divide-and-rule sectarian politics espoused by the then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, 
the Baghdad-based Shiʿa parties gained inroads into the DIBs by empowering co-religion-
ists such as the Shiʿa Turkmen, whom they supported with access to salaries and services. 
1   Peter Bartu, ‘Wrestling with the Integrity of a Nation: The Disputed Internal Boundaries in Iraq’, 
International Affairs 86/6, 1 November 2010, pp. 1329–43.
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Figure 1: Map of Iraq Highlighting the KRI and the Disputed Territories 
Data Source: ‘Reviving UN Mediation on Iraq’s Disputed Internal Boundaries’, Crisis Group Report, 14 December 2018.
Two major events – the rise of ISIS in 2014 and the Kurdish independence referendum 
of 2017 – have generated a change in the nature of the conflict, transforming a two-sided 
dispute over sovereignty into a multi-side struggle for localised control. The withdrawal of 
federal troops in the face of the ISIS assault created a security vacuum that a number of 
armed groups, including the Peshmerga and various branches of the Popular Mobilization 
Forces (PMF) would quickly fill through liberation operations. The state-funded PMF is by 
no means a monolith. It is a vast umbrella organisation encompassing numerous armed 
groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the GoI, Iran and other group-specific interests.2 
The Badr Organization,3 the largest of the PMF, is simultaneously aligned with, and com-
peting against, other factions, such as pro-Iran Asaʾib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kataʾib Hezbollah 
2   Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, ‘The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future’, Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 28 April 2017. Available at https://carnegie-mec.org/2017/04/28/
popular-mobilization-forces-and-iraq-s-future-pub-68810.
3   Guido Steinberg, ‘The Badr Organization: Iran’s Most Important Instrument in Iraq’, German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, July 2017. Available at https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/
publication/the-badr-organization-irans-instrument-in-iraq/.
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and other various minority group-based factions, such as the Assyrian Christian Nineveh 
Plain Protection Units and the Shabak Shiʿa PMF.4 As these disparate forces moved into the 
DIBs along with Kurdish and Iraqi armies in anti-ISIS military operations, the area became 
a site of multi-sided struggle for post-liberation control. 
While the Kurds made serious gains during the 2014–17 period and enjoyed full control 
of strategically important Kirkuk, the tables soon turned in favour of the PMF and GoI 
with the Kurdish referendum. In the ill-timed and controversial independence referen-
dum of September 2017, Kurdish parties ensured that votes were cast across many areas 
of the DIBs, a strong provocation against GoI claims to sovereignty. In turn, the referen-
dum created momentum in Baghdad for a full onslaught against Kurdish control over the 
DIBs.5 In October 2017, a mixture of the Iraqi Army and PMF moved northward and soon 
took control over the disputed areas of Kirkuk, Diyala, Salahaddin and Nineveh. The GoI-
backed side regained total security control over the disputed territories and expelled both 
KRG security forces and much of the administrative personnel. Kurdish forces now stand 
at the 2003 borders, a development that represents a huge territorial loss. 
However, the GoI reassertion of power has not entailed an end to the struggle over control. 
Not only do the Kurdish political parties remain active in many areas of the DIBs, but 
the GoI and state-backed PMF are fractured into numerous armed groups and political 
parties. The territories are now an arena for conflict between these entities, all of which 
use ethno-sectarian ideology, threats of violence, the political marketplace and the strug-
gle to dominate institutions as a way to compete with others. At the same time, residents 
from all ethno-sectarian backgrounds point to the weakness of the GoI and express disin-
terest in the state. There is a general sense of confusion around who has the authority to 
make decisions and how services can be administered. 
While it is theoretically possible that Baghdad will find a pathway to provide services and 
security in the DIBs and consolidate the various factions behind the central government, 
it is more likely that the political field will continue to fragment and benefit quasi-govern-
mental groups such as the PMF, specifically the radical factions of Badr and the AAH. If 
this were to transpire, the short and long-term implications would be severe: Ethno-na-
tionalists among the Kurds, Sunni and Shiʿa Arabs, and Shiʿa Turkmen would be able to 
capitalise on the tensions in the disputed territories to increase social capital within core 
Kurdish and Arab areas. This would eventually sideline more moderate and pro-reformist 
movements, and the more compromising administrators and functionaries within Badr. 
Such a development would only exacerbate the militarisation and securitisation of poli-
tics in the KRG and the rest of Iraq, inviting deeper influence from Iran, Turkey and other 
regional actors. 
4   Erica Gaston and András Derzsi-Horváth, ‘Iraq after ISIL: An Analysis of Local, Hybrid, and Sub-
State Security Forces’, Global Public Policy Institute, 27 December 2017. Available at https://www.gppi.
net/2017/12/27/iraq-after-isil-an-analysis-of-local-hybrid-and-sub-state-security-forces.
5   Loveday Morris, ‘How the Kurdish independence referendum backfired spectacularly’, The 
Washington Post, 20 October 2017. Available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/how-the-
kurdish-independence-referendum-backfired-/2017/10/20/3010c820-b371-11e7-9b93-b97043e57a22_
story.html?utm_term=.728b97fb523b.
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Scope and Objectives
With the objective of devising policies oriented towards counteracting these potential-
ities, the aim of this report is to understand the evolution of the DIBs conflict from a 
two-dimensional contest over sovereignty to a multi-sided competition between rival mil-
itary and political groups. The research focuses on two vital but unappreciated areas of the 
DIBs: northern Diyala (Figure 2) and Tuz Khurmatu (Figure 3). As the vast majority of the 
media and policy attention is directed towards either Kirkuk, due to oil interests, or the 
Nineveh Plains, due to the presence of vulnerable ethnic minorities,6 the other centres of 
the DIBs receive insufficient consideration among scholars, policy makers and develop-
ment practitioners. Some NGOs have gone so far as to make a policy of avoiding Tuz and 
northern Diyala altogether due to the difficulty of local conditions and the ever-present 
potential for violence. This is a grave error. The DIBs cannot be resolved without engaging 
these two regions, as they are strategically important for commercial and political reasons, 
and any final deal will have to include them. 
In the analysis of the cases, the research employs two key concepts. First, the political 
marketplace refers to ‘transactional politics that facilitate the purchase of political loyal-
ties in exchange for material reward’,7 creating a dominance of patronage relations across 
the entire political hierarchy.8 The disputed territories of Iraq have become an intense 
battleground for competing entities to gain support through the extension of jobs, con-
tracts and services to ethnically aligned and/or supportive constituents. Second, moral 
populism refers to the ‘ability to both mobilise and divide populations by deploying exclu-
sivist religious and ethnic rhetoric’.9 The various groups vying for influence in the DIBs 
have attempted to employ an ethno-sectarian or nationalist rhetoric that mobilises local 
support, inflaming ethno-sectarian affiliations and emphasising Kurdish-ness or Shiʿa-
ness, respectively. While both moral populism and the political marketplace drive conflict 
in Tuz and northern Diyala, they are manifested to varying degrees. In northern Diyala, the 
key dynamic driving instability is the political marketplace, as different groups compete 
over a war economy that fuels patronage networks. In Tuz Khurmatu, moral populism has 
generated intense episodes of intercommunal violence. 
6   ‘Iraq takes disputed areas as Kurds “withdraw to 2014 lines”’, BBC News, 18 October 2017. Available 
at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-41663350; Stefan Wolff, ‘Governing (in) Kirkuk: 
resolving the status of a disputed territory in post-American Iraq’, International Affairs 86/6 (2010), 
pp. 1361–79.
7   Toby Dodge et al., ‘Iraq Synthesis Paper: Understanding the Drivers of Conflict in Iraq’, LSE Middle 
East Centre, October 2018. Available at http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/90514/. 
8   Alex de Waal, ‘Introduction to the Political Marketplace for Policymakers’, JSRP Policy Brief 1, March 
2016. Available at http://www.lse.ac.uk/internationalDevelopment/research/JSRP/downloads/JSRP-
Brief-1.pdf. 
9   Dodge et al., ‘Iraq Synthesis Paper’. 
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Method
The research mainly relied on local fieldwork and interviews conducted by the research 
team, comprised of Iraqi and international researchers, in each locality analysed. The tar-
geted sample group has varied according to the context. The researchers used existing 
contacts to map out an initial list of key relevant officials and actors involved in security, 
administration and civil society, and then followed additional leads. A total of 80 inter-
views were conducted between 1 August and 1 December 2018. Interviewees included: 
governors of provinces; provincial council members; district and subdistrict council 
members; local commanders of Badr and AAH; members of the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF), Federal Police and RRF; heads of the political branches of Badr, AAH, PUK and 
KDP; local businesspeople; humanitarian and development workers; and smugglers and 
others involved in illicit trade.
The research also draws upon literature and desk study analysis, which sought to contex-
tualise conflict in the DIBs within a broader historical and sociological context. Sources 
included federal and KRG records, data on incidents of violence and conflict, election 
results, data on displacement and news sources in Arabic, Kurdish and English. The liter-
ature review focused generally on the disputed territories and specifically on the two areas 
examined in this report. 
Northern Diyala: Competition over the Political 
Marketplace 
The northern Diyala district of Khanaqin 
is strategically important for commercial, 
security and political reasons. The region 
is inhabited by large Kurdish, Arab (Shiʿa 
and Sunni), and Turkmen populations 
perceived by Kurdish and Baghdad-based 
parties as significant voting blocs. The 
district centre is majority Kurd (85 
percent), 10 while large populations of 
both Kurds and Sunni Arabs reside in the 
subdistricts of Jalawla and Sadiyah. The 
district is rich in oil and produces major 
revenues via two border crossings with 
Iran, the Mounzariah and Paruezkhan 
crossings. Given the district’s proxim-
ity to the KRI, the Kurdish government 
sought to exert its influence by whatever 
10   Interview with Muhammed Mulla Hassan, Mayor of Khanaqin, September 2018.
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Figure 2: Map of Diyala District
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means possible. Between 2003 and 2014, the KRG and particularly PUK succeeded in 
mobilising support within the district centre, where the Kurds of the large Fayli tribe 
tend to lean politically towards the Kurdish region.11 Extensive KRG payrolls cemented 
the support of local employees, including many non-Kurds. The KRG made payments of 
money and cars to Arab tribal leaders in Jalawla and Sadiyah in exchange for loyalty,12 and 
provided employment for Arabs and Turkmen in all three cities. This not only ensured 
Kurdish dominance but also garnered support among non-Kurdish communities for the 
eventual annexation of Khanaqin into the KRI.
This high-stakes political marketplace would soon have to contend with the entrance of 
new and powerful actors. Beginning in 2008, Nouri al-Maliki set his sights on Khanaqin 
and pledged to assert GoI control, largely in response to protests from his political base 
over perceived Kurdish expansionism across the disputed territories. The former Prime 
Minister provoked a major political crisis when he sent Iraqi troops to Khanaqin, demand-
ing that all 4,000 Peshmerga fighters retreat from the city. While KRG President Masoud 
Barzani and Maliki ultimately agreed on a compromise that placed the Peshmerga to the 
north and ISF to the south of the city,13 the ‘Khanaqin standoff ’ highlighted the very real 
possibility for KRG–GoI violence over the DIBs. 14 The security situation remained fragile 
and contested for years to come. 
The rise of ISIS in 2014 resulted in the complete withdrawal of federal forces from north-
ern Diyala, creating a security vacuum. The void invited both Kurdish forces and the PMF, 
particularly Badr, to extend their reach across the region through liberation operations. 
In the three years that followed, each side used forms of patronage to win over support-
ers. While Khanaqin centre was never taken by ISIS and came under nearly uncontested 
Kurdish control, a deal between the PUK and Badr stipulated that Kurdish forces were 
to be granted control over the town of Jalawla while Badr would have jurisdiction over 
nearby Sadiyah. Badr’s foothold into Khanaqin would only increase from the takeover of 
Sadiyah in 2015. 
With the independence referendum and the assertion of GoI control in October 2017, the 
Peshmerga were forced out of Khanaqin. The victorious PMF were compelled to tread care-
fully in their move to assert control, however. Badr and AAH planned to come into Khanaqin 
alongside the Iraqi Army – branding themselves as a unified PMF.15 This attempt was chal-
lenged locally with huge anti-PMF rallies.16 The Diyala chief of police at the time, a Badr 
affiliate himself, claims he had to personally exhort Badr and AAH military commanders 
11   The Fayli Kurds are religiously Shiʿa but politically aligned along ethnic lines with their fellow Sunni 
Kurds in the KRG. 
12   Interview with member of the PUK branch in Khanaqin (Head of Election Division), October 2018. 
13   Gareth Stansfield and Liam Anderson, ‘Kurds in Iraq: The Struggle between Baghdad and Erbil’, 
Middle East Policy 16/1, March 2009, pp. 134–45.
14   Quil Lawrence, ‘A Precarious Peace in Northern Iraq’, Middle East Report Online, 10 January 2009. 
Available at https://merip.org/2009/10/a-precarious-peace-in-northern-iraq/. 
15   Interview with Head of the AAH coordination office in Jalawla, October 2018.
16   ‘One killed, three wounded in protest in Khanaqin’, Rudaw, 19 October 2017. Available at http://
www.rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/191020177.
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against entering the city. He performatively stood in front of the photo of Jalal Talabani 
and saluted it before the protestors, declaring that Badr and AAH troops would never 
be allowed into the city. In this way, he partially aligned himself with the moral popu-
lism of Kurdish nationalism.17 In general, Badr-backed federal functionaries have adopted 
a public rhetoric of rebuffing the Badr and AAH military wings, accordingly succeeding 
in operating with a veneer of legitimacy among the Kurdish population. However, these 
functionaries are generally perceived to be beholden to the broader Badr-controlled polit-
ical apparatus,18 which is rooted in the office of the Governor in Baquba. 
Badr and AAH troops have taken up posts outside the city as a compromise position and 
limited their official presence in the district centre to their political offices. Their presence 
however remains significant and highly securitised. The PMF occupy a prominently situ-
ated building opposite the mayor’s office atop a hill, with staff and security forces housed 
within the headquarters mostly Badr members. AAH maintains its headquarters along 
the southern fringe of the city, having posted a large picture of their controversial leader 
Qays Khazali on the main road to be seen by anyone entering or leaving the city from the 
south.19 Security in the city centre is officially shared but is actually dominated by the 
federal authorities under heavy Badr influence. Kurdish intelligence and security forces 
(Asayish) are permitted to stand at checkpoints alongside Iraqi police, though they have 
been stripped of the authority to make arrests. The arrangement, which Badr and the PUK 
struck under Iranian mediation, aimed to appease the large pro-KRG Kurdish population 
of Khanaqin. Badr commanders noted that they had local Kurds on their payroll within 
the city that could be mobilised within minutes in the event of a security emergency.20 
The PMF have support at all levels of government, including the Badr-backed Governor of 
Diyala, who praises the ‘strong relations and coordination between the province’s security 
forces and the PMF’.21
Administratively, Badr-backed federal authorities did not force out all the existing Kurdish, 
predominately PUK, administration. They permitted the co-presence of KRG and GoI 
administrations for the provision of public services. However, the centre of political 
control has shifted towards the federal ministries, the governorate capital of Baquba and 
the Badr-backed provincial administration. The mayor’s office and directors now execute 
their duties with the knowledge that the governorate authorities control the bulk of Khan-
aqin’s salary distributions. The mayor, a PUK affiliate, is mindful of the new realities of the 
political marketplace and does not want Kurds to be cut out of the government payroll.22 
17   Interview with Chief of Police, Khanaqin, September 2018. 
18   Interviews with Kurdish and Sunni Arab community leaders in Khanaqin, August – November 2018. 
19   The US government has debated whether to designate Khazali a terrorist.
20   Interviews with brigadier commanders within Badr in Khanaqin, September – October 2018.
21   Interview with Muthana al-Timimi, Diyala Governor, Member of Badr Organization, Baquba, 
September 2017. 
22   Interviews with Muhammed Mulla Hassan Mayor of Khanaqin and select PUK officials, September 
– November 2018.
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PMF factions controlling Khanaqin District work together but are not united. Both Badr 
and AAH have sought to gain the upper hand in the subdistricts surrounding the city 
centre. It is in Sadiyah that Badr wields the firmest hold over security. Privately, Badr’s 
leadership regards Sadiyah as ‘an incubator of terrorism’ given that Sunni Arabs make up 
the majority of the town’s population and many allegedly sided with ISIS.23 Yet in public, 
Badr has made overtures to the local Sunni community. One Badr commander noted: 
‘We have tried to forge good local relations and have provided some of the Sunni Arab 
men with weapons. How do you think Badr got the most votes in Sadiyah during the last 
[May 2018 parliamentary] elections?’24 A high-ranking government official from Sadiyah 
complained that his former bodyguard was granted a ‘handsome salary, a piece of land 
and a house’ in exchange for joining Badr ranks as a commander.25 But the strength of the 
political marketplace has not been enough to win over everyone. A Sunni Arab IDP from 
Sadiyah noted:
Security forces that are now in Sadiyah are not from the area. The PMF and the 
Iraqi Army are mostly from southern Iraq and don’t understand the area and its 
people. I don’t go back to Sadiyah because I cannot. My house has been destroyed, 
and our goods and properties have been looted.26
Some Sunni Arab leaders have even called for a local Sunni Arab force to secure the area 
and expel the PMF.27
AAH is dominant in the mixed Kurdish and Sunni Arab town of Jalawla. AAH, a pro-
Iran militia accused of committing anti-Sunni atrocities in other parts of Iraq, gained 
support among local Sunni Arabs by exploiting a key commodity within northern Diya-
la’s political marketplace: the right to return. Between 2016 and 2017, during the period 
of Kurdish control, the Peshmerga had expelled certain Sunni Arab residents allegedly 
affiliated with ISIS. Following GoI takeover, the AAH granted many of them return and a 
salary in exchange for conscription within their ranks. The political marketplace is heavily 
slanted against Sunni Arabs. Given their political vulnerability, they have little choice but 
to pledge allegiance to the PMF in exchange for safety, security and financial stability. In 
Jalawla, the AAH control all major revenue-generating channels and man checkpoints on 
commercially strategic roads, imposing taxes on vehicles passing through, and earning 
an estimated daily amount of $300,000 in fees, according to a PUK government official.28 
With the rising potential of an ISIS resurgence in northern Diyala,29 the Asayish have repeat-
edly exhorted Badr to intervene and stop the AAH’s reliance on former ISIS members as 
23   Interview with Badr officials in Diyala, September – October 2018.
24   Interview with Badr commander in Sadiyah, October 2018.
25   Interview with Ahmed Zargushi, Mayor of Sadiyah, October 2018.
26   Interview with Sunni Arab IDP from Sadiyah in Khanaqin camp, October 2018.
27   Interview with Abdul Khaliq al-Azawi, former Diyala Governorate Council Member, October 2018.
28   Interview with PUK subdistrict council member in Jalawla, October 2018.
29   Michael Knights and Alex Mello, ‘Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic state 
could exploit Iraq’s sectarian tinderbox’, CTC Sentinel 9/10, October 2016, p. 25. Available at https://
ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2016/10/CTC-SENTINEL_Vol9Iss109.pdf.
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recruits, but there is little Badr can do to control its fellow PMF member. Khazali, whose 
party won 15 seats in the most recent parliamentary election, is now a formidable force 
both militarily and politically. Given these electoral successes, AAH members in Jalawla 
and across Khanaqin understand the importance of establishing the party as a quasi-le-
gitimate political entity. The head of the AAH office in Jalawla diplomatically framed the 
policy of embracing the Sunni Arabs of Jalawla as a matter of cross-sectarian co-existence: 
‘Our door is open to all sects, ethnicities, groups and tribes, and we have held meetings 
with different sections of society in Jalawla. We do not want people to feel discriminated 
against. We want all citizens to have a sense justice and equality.’30
However, the PUK and Sunni Arab leadership of the area rejected this rhetoric and 
described an overall state of lawlessness. A Sunni Arab politician from Sadiyah noted: 
‘Chaos reigns in Khanaqin, Jalawla and Sadiyah, where Hashd [PMF] and the Iraqi military 
rule… People support them out of fear.’31 Badr leaders were familiar with such accusa-
tions and they blamed ‘radicals’ within the organisation, the AAH and even the Iraqi Army 
for abuses.32 These accusations indicate that the political marketplace is the organising 
concept in an emerging political rhetoric. Badr seeks to establish itself as the long-term 
keeper of the peace and order by rhetorically placing itself above the political market-
place. For now, it seems that the local Kurdish and Sunni Arab populace is not convinced. 
Tuz Khurmatu: Intercommunal Violence and Moral 
Populism 
Tuz Khurmatu, a commercial centre and 
transport hub in the northeast of Salahad-
din, has witnessed more violence than 
any other area of the disputed territories, 
most recently between the Kurdish and 
Shiʿa Turkmen communities. Tensions 
initially arose in the years following the 
fall of the regime in 2003 due to the polit-
ical dominance of the Kurds, who took 
advantage of US backing and occupied the 
buildings of the former Iraqi regime. They 
held the office of the mayor and other key 
positions, and sought to administratively 
align the city with Kirkuk over and above 
Tikrit. Ultimately, they filled the political 
and governmental vacuum in the district, 
30   Interview with Head of AAH coordination office in Jalawla, October 2018.
31   Interview with Sunni Arab member of Sadiyah District Council, October 2018.
32   Interview with PMF Brigade Commander and former Badr Organization member, September 2018.
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leaving the large Turkmen and Arab communities of Tuz Khurmatu mostly powerless.33 
In the ensuing months and years, the Turkmen community, who view Tuz as their key 
cultural capital and historic population centre, resented the outsized influence of the KRG 
and the capacity of the Kurdish parties to buy local influence through payroll distribu-
tions.34 When the Turkmen and Arabs began to complain about the ‘Kurdification’ of Tuz 
Khurmatu in 2004 and 2005, US forces and administrators took limited measures to 
balance out the local distribution of power. They raided KDP and PUK political headquar-
ters in Tuz, demanding full disarmament, while continuing to provide broader support 
for the Kurds of Tuz.35 The Peshmerga formed the core of the local US-backed Iraqi Civil 
Defense Corps, which eventually became the 16th Brigade of the US-trained Iraqi Army. By 
2010, 70 percent of the 16th Brigade remained Kurdish and engaged in regular joint count-
er-terrorism operations with US forces.36 Turkmen resentment towards the Kurds and the 
US–Kurdish alliance ultimately coalesced into a violent resistance. Elements within the 
Sunni Turkmen community joined al-Qaeda alongside Sunni Arabs, and Shiʿa Turkmen 
joined ranks with the Mahdi Army. 
Kurdish leaders in Tuz would reject any notion that their political position was arbitrarily 
favoured by the American invasion. They justified their dominance over post-2003 poli-
tics as the natural reversal of Saddam era policies. They reasoned that Saddam separated 
Tuz from Kirkuk and merged it with Salahaddin in 1976 in order to reduce the Kurdish 
population of the oil-rich province, and that they were now merely restoring the natural 
political order. In truth, both the Kurdish and Turkmen populations of Tuz could point 
to historical markers of victimhood. Both were subjected to violence and displacement 
during Saddam’s Anfal campaign.37 
As part of the broader sectarian politics of Nouri al-Maliki during the 2010–14 period, which 
coincided with the 2011 withdrawal of American troops, the Baghdad-based Shiʿa parties 
directed positions and services to their co-religionists in the Shiʿa Turkmen community. 
The balance of power would gradually start to move in the direction of the Turkmen – 
specifically the Shiʿa Turkmen. A new federal security force was established in the district. 
It comprised almost entirely of Shiʿa Turkmen, a move that the Prime Minister justified 
as a protective measure due to attacks by radical Sunni Arab elements against them. As 
both communities increasingly saw the other as encroaching on its hold on power, forms 
of political speech emerged that pitted ethno-nationalist discourses against one another. 
What began as a fight over resources and power quickly became infused with violent sec-
tarian rhetoric. 
33   Interview with Kurdish and Turkmen government and political party officials in Tuz Khurmatu, 
October 2018. 
34   Ibid. 
35   Interview with Kurdish former military commanders in Tuz Khurmatu, November 2018.
36   Interview with the former commander of the 16th Brigade of the US trained Iraqi Army, November 
2018.
37   Interviews with Kurdish and Shiʿa Turkmen community leaders, residents and local government, 
October – November 2018.
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With tensions already running high, the threat of ISIS and the withdrawal of federal forces 
created a security vacuum in the district. Unlike Khanaqin, where a relatively homogenous 
Kurdish populace resisted the military influence of Badr, in Tuz Khurmatu, Badr and the 
PMF would find local support in the Shiʿa Turkmen community. After a brief period of 
complete Peshmerga control 2014, an Iran-brokered deal allowed Badr to assert control 
over certain areas of Tuz district, particularly those with large Shiʿa Turkmen populations 
such as Amirli. Throughout 2015 and 2016, political and military control of Tuz splin-
tered off into arenas of influence for the Peshmerga, Badr and other PMF factions. Shiʿa 
Turkmen joined the ranks of the PMF flowing into the district from the southern prov-
inces. The securitisation of the city engendered intense periods of violence. 
On two separate occasions, in November 2015 and April 2016, street clashes erupted 
between Shiʿa Turkmen and Kurds,38 with both the Peshmerga and the PMF bringing extra 
forces into the city. During the second round of clashes, a group of Shiʿa Turkmen with 
PMF insignia and Iraqi flags on their chests, and a flag bearing an ‘Oh Hussein’ inscription 
hanging on a wall behind them, proclaimed the following: ‘We Shiʿa stood firm in the face 
of ISIS, but you Kurds ran away from ISIS…We will bombard and hit you with the rockets 
of the Islamic resistance […] we will turn the soil and ground into a mass graveyard for 
the Kurds and for the sons of Barzani.’39 Meanwhile, the speeches of major Kurdish polit-
ical figures provoked the Turkmen as stooges of Turkey and stoked Kurdish nationalism 
among the local population. Moral populism was toxic during these episodes of violence.
The clashes resulted in the injury and death of more than 20 fighters in total from both 
sides. During these episodes of violence in Tuz Khurmatu, schools were closed and people 
stayed home for weeks out of fear of becoming targets of snipers. Several meetings failed 
to put an end to the tensions. Kurdish political figures contacted the leaders of the Shiʿa 
parties in the south and urged them not to back members of Tuz’s Shiʿa Turkmen com-
munity. In these overtures, Kurds accused the Turkish intelligence services of using the 
Shiʿa Turkmen to challenge the KRG’s influence in the district.40 But both the Shiʿa estab-
lishment and Badr showed little sign of accepting this line of argument. It is likely that 
growing intra-Shiʿa rivalries between AAH and Badr, which grew particularly intense in the 
areas of Tuz liberated from ISIS,41 scuttled the possibility for a unified deal with the Kurds. 
When Peshmerga leaders demanded the PMF to leave the central district, Badr leader 
Hadi al-Ameri personally intervened to reject the idea. In a press conference, he asserted 
that ‘we in the PMF are no strangers to the area and we will remain’.42 This claim about the 
38   ‘Deaths during battles in Tuz Khurmatu and Abadi intervenes’, Al Jazeera, 24 April 2016 [in Arabic]. 
Available at http://www.aljazeera.net/news%2Farabic%2F2016%2F4%2F24%2F-وتامروخزوط-كراعمب-ىلتق
لخدتي-يدابعلاو 
39   Alawi al-Shamri, ‘Message from the Mujahideen of Tuz Khurmatu to the heroes of the PMF’, 
YouTube, 4 May 2016, Available at https://youtu.be/Wz74HtaIdfg. 
40   Interviews with Kurdish politicians and Peshmerga leaders in Tuz Khurmatu, November 2018.
41   Christine van den Toorn, ‘High Noon in Iraq’s Wild West’, Foreign Policy, 22 February 2016. Available 
at https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/02/22/high-noon-in-iraqs-wild-west/. 
42   Al Jazeera Arabic, ‘Tuz-Khurmatu: Meeting between Peshmerga and the Shiʿa PMUs ends with no 
results’, YouTube, 27 April 2016. Available at https://youtu.be/JLDsuONfrZs. 
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indigeneity of the PMF signalled to the local Shiʿa Turkmen community that they were the 
means through which the PMF would continue to claim legitimacy. 
This inter-communal strife culminated with the September 2017 Kurdish independence 
referendum. Following the advance of federal forces and PMF and the retreat of the Pesh-
merga in October, 50,000 Kurds fled the city for fear of violent reprisals. Shiʿa Turkmen 
and elements within Badr and the AAH burned down the houses of Kurdish officials, 
Peshmerga members and Kurdish residents.43 Badr officials blamed these incidents on 
radical elements within their own ranks.44 
Three weeks later, the GoI intervened to broker a deal for the return of the Kurds to the 
city. With the backing of the Prime Minister’s office, GoI officials met with Kurdish and 
Turkmen community leaders in Tuz and convinced them to allow a neutral government 
force, the RRF, to protect the peace and facilitate return. The arrival of the force in January 
2018 led to a thaw in the violence and the return of many Kurds. 45 However, the return of 
Kurdish families has not resulted in a restoration of their former political power. While 
Badr and AAH do not have military bases inside the central district, they maintain several 
strategically-located bases a few kilometres outside the city centre: Brigade 52 of the 
PMF, mostly Badr forces, are stationed at nearby Sadiq Airfield, used by US forces as 
their Tuz headquarters until 2011;46 Badr convoys move through the city at will; the PMF 
has established total control over the city administration, controlling all the major posts; 
and Badr-backed elements have replaced Kurdish governmental functionaries with Shiʿa 
Turkmen. 
As Badr has assumed effective control over Tuz, its leadership now faces a vexing conun-
drum: they enjoy local influence because of the Shiʿa Turkmen community, but the 
radicalism of this community’s moral populism, which has also gained momentum among 
the secular Iraqi Turkmen Front, renders governance of a diverse city exceedingly complex.47
With both the Shiʿa Turkmen and their secular counterparts emboldened, Hadi al-Ameri 
has taken the tack of empowering Badr-backed technocrats as official administrators in 
order to keep the peace with the Kurds while simultaneously appeasing radical Turkmen 
with the lion’s share of actual power. An Arab district council member in Tuz claimed: 
‘The mayor is absolutely powerless. He has been surrounded by advisers appointed by 
Shiʿa militia parties in his office.’48 The mayor openly admitted that influential figures 
within Badr and AAH regularly imposed their agendas on him. He has even received a 
43   Interview with Kurdish officials and residents of Tuz Khurmatu, November 2018. See also ‘Iraq: Fresh 
evidence that tens of thousands forced to flee Tuz Khurmatu amid indiscriminate attacks, lootings and 
arson’, Amnesty International, 24 October 2017.
44   Interviews with Badr commanders and Badr affiliates, August – November 2018.
45   Interview with Ayub Dawdi (Kurd), Deputy Mayor of Tuz Khurmatu and Head of the Department 
for Displaced Persons, September 2018.
46   Interview with government and various political party officials in Tuz Khurmatu, December 2018.
47   South Kurdistan, ‘A Turkmen MP threatens the Kurds and characterizes them as terrorists’, 
YouTube, 11 April 2018. Available at https://youtu.be/u0JxIhDJfYo. 
48   Interview with Sunni Arab District Council member in Tuz Khurmatu, November 2018.
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letter signed by Ameri himself ordering him to comply with any and all orders from a 
certain Shiʿa Turkmen Badr leader. The mayor characterised the Badr representative as his 
main rival in the district – even though he is himself aligned with Badr. 49 
While the mayor and other elements within the Badr-backed federal administration are 
concerned about the extreme anti-Kurdish moral populism and violence of the Shiʿa 
Turkmen militias, the realities of the political marketplace force these administrators 
into a weak position. The mayor clarified: ‘The [Badr] leadership listens to those who 
provide them with cash, which I do not have. Armed groups make money and are there-
fore favoured by the leadership.’ Both AAH and Badr are active participants in a political 
marketplace fuelled through a war economy. According to a high-ranking Shiʿa Turkmen 
official in Tuz, AAH’s ‘economic committee’ has been using employees within various 
service offices to collect taxes from all types of businesses including shops, private clinics, 
restaurants and block factories.50 In addition to cash collected at checkpoints along stra-
tegic commercial roads,51 this money is in turn used to purchase the influence that the 
mayor himself lacks.52 
The periods of intercommunal violence are still fresh on Tuz residents’ minds. Darbaz 
Mohammed, former Minister of Migration who helped broker the deal facilitating the 
entrance of the RRF into the city, cautioned against any hint of optimism: 
Tuz Khurmatu is like a time bomb that could explode at any minute. For Tuz 
to return to communal war, it only requires murdering a young Shiʿa Turkmen, 
which would definitely ignite a civil war in the town. There are armed groups 
ready to take advantage of any development…’53 
Unfortunately, in the summer of 2018 the GoI was forced to withdraw parts of the RRF 
and redeploy them to Basra, where popular protests threatened the province’s stability. It 
replaced the departed RRF with regular Iraqi Army units, which a Kurdish administrative 
official from Tuz claimed were mostly Shiʿa Arabs sympathetic to the Shiʿa Turkmen.54 
Meanwhile, moral populism remains toxic on both sides, although the Kurds are forced 
to limit public expression of their views. One Kurdish community leader privately noted 
during a November 2018 interview: ‘Once the balance of power has shifted and we are in 
control again, the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs will kill every Shiʿa Turkmen in the city. We 
will never forget what they did to us.’55
49   Interview with Hassan Zain Abdeen, Mayor of Tuz Khurmatu, November 2018.
50   Interview with a high-ranking Shiʿa Turkmen government official in Tuz, November 2018.
51   Mark DeWeaver, ‘Decentralized Rent Seeking in Iraq’s Post-ISIS Economy: A Warning from the 
Concrete Block Industry’, Institute of Regional and International Studies, August 2017. Available at 
http://auis.edu.krd/iris/iraq-report/decentralized-rent-seeking-iraqs-post-isis-economy. 
52   Interview with a high-ranking administrative official in Tuz, November 2018.
53   Interview with Darbaz Mohammed, Former Minister of Migration and Displacement, November 
2018.
54   Interview with a Kurdish administrative official in Tuz, November 2018.
55   Interview with a Kurdish community leader in Tuz Khurmatu, November 2018. 
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Conclusion: Towards a Return of Public Authority
Despite the severity of these expressions of ethno-sectarian differences, the one sentiment 
that united all constituents within northern Diyala and Tuz Khurmatu was a complete dis-
satisfaction with public services. In the past, such expressions of discontent were quickly 
diffused through a two-way blame game with the GoI pinning administrative failures on 
the KRG and vice versa. However, following the events of October 2017, the GoI lacks 
excuses as the KRG and Kurdish parties no longer hold any plausible responsibility over 
the DIBs. Members of local government from all ethnicities claimed that neither Baquba 
(the capital of Diyala) nor Tikrit (the capital of Salahaddin) sent any funds for public 
works and services. They added that provincial governments still operated under the old 
thinking that Khanaqin and Tuz were peripheral second class cities outside their immedi-
ate realm of concern and influence. 
Accordingly, public authority56 at the administrative level is fractured to the point of dis-
integration. Badr, AAH and other PMF factions hold power over security but lack the 
funds, expertise and bureaucratic coherence to effectively administer services and engage 
in reconstruction. This is an area where the new ministries forming in Baghdad can imme-
diately gain leverage in the disputed territories. While the security sector will likely remain 
in the hands of the PMF in the near future, the international community must work with 
the GoI to empower district and subdistrict level governments and grant them the funds 
and expertise to administer services. Even if these local governments are under Badr influ-
ence, as the above cases suggest, Badr is not a coherent monolithic entity. Strengthening 
moderate federal administrators by providing them with reconstruction funds and service 
capacity could increase the material and symbolic presence of the GoI. 
Failure to support local government with adequate capacity and funds will only lead to 
increased concentration of the means of revenue generation in the hands of armed groups, 
effectively entrenching a political marketplace fuelled by a war economy. Smuggling and 
illegal taxation through checkpoints flourish across the DIBs. These illegal activities have 
been carried out by armed actors with links to influential political parties in Baghdad, 
who have sought to increase patronage networks and the position of allies.57 Any plan 
to strengthen the capacity of local government must ensure that state funds are moni-
tored and only maintained on the condition of equitable service delivery and employment 
across the various local political and ethno-sectarian constituents. A strengthened public 
sector and local government will only gain legitimacy if it counters the current prevailing 
system of patronage. 
Specific community grievances must also be addressed. Just as the GoI was successful in 
facilitating the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to Tuz by sending the RRF, 
it can gain further local legitimacy by facilitating the return and compensation of IDPs 
56   Dodge et al., ‘Iraq Synthesis Paper’.
57   Interviews with local politicians, administrative officials and citizens in Diyala and Tuz Khurmatu, 
September – November 2018. 
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across the DIBs. In Khanaqin, for instance, the presence of Sunni Arab IDPs in the district 
centre stokes Kurdish fears of ‘a new method of Arabisation by the Baghdad government’, 
giving Kurdish ethno-nationalist parties rhetorical ammunition to generate anti-Arab 
and anti-Baghdad feelings. Finding a solution for the IDPs in Khanaqin would lessen the 
potency of this rhetoric. Simultaneously, the GoI must help in fulfilling justice for civil-
ians from all sides whose properties have been damaged and looted and whose family 
members have been killed. The remnants of destroyed and burned buildings indicate past 
episodes of violence and must be remedied if stability and intercommunal trust is to be 
restored. 
The window for a grand Erbil–Baghdad deal is quickly closing, or may already be closed. 
In addition to the fragmentation of the PMF and the Shiʿa political bloc, there are major 
tensions and divisions within the KRG. During the October 2017 Kurdish withdrawal from 
the DIBs, the KDP accused the PUK of treason and siding with the GoI. It is highly unlikely 
that the PUK and KDP, and much less the various constituents within the GoI and PMF 
umbrella, will come to a holistic agreement at any point in the foreseeable future. But this 
should not compel the GoI and KRG, in addition to regional and international partners, 
to adopt a position of disengagement. A continuation of the status quo, in which the 
DIBs become an increasingly hostile point of competition among armed actors, will only 
benefit ethno-nationalists among the Kurds, Sunni and Shiʿa Arabs and Shiʿa Turkmen, 
allowing them to tap into moral populism to mobilise political support. This would even-
tually lead to a sidelining of more moderate and pro-reformist movements, civil society 
organisations and parties within the KRI and the rest of Iraq, and invite the outsized influ-
ence of regional actors. 
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